Episode #333 Why Smart Clinicians Make Mistakes And How Systems Prevent Harm
November 18, 2026Welcome to the next installment of the Anesthesia Patient Safety podcast hosted by Alli Bechtel. This podcast will be an exciting journey towards improved anesthesia patient safety.
Today we’re talking about patient safety from a slightly different perspective. Welcome Dr. Adam Shehata and Dr. Amir Hamid, the host of The Medical Safety Podcast. Their podcast explores patient safety through a really interesting combination of clinical medicine, human factors, aviation, law, incidents investigation, and systems thinking. We hope that you enjoy this interview show and that you’ll check out their podcast.
https://www.medicalsafetypodcast.com/
Here are the key themes that we discuss on the show:
- Systems vs. Individual Accountability: Patient safety errors result from system failures, not individual fault. Healthcare needs professional safety investigation models similar to aviation, nuclear power, and oil and gas industries.
- Safety Culture: Effective safety systems make right actions easy and wrong actions difficult. Leadership must support safety over production pressure, exemplified by the USS Carl Vinson story where reporting a missing wrench was commended.
- Safety and Efficiency: The safest systems are often the most efficient. Taking time to prevent complications improves long-term efficiency. Suggested developing patient safety delay codes similar to aviation.
- Intervention Design: Effective safety interventions require professional investigations, risk assessments, and cost-benefit analyses. Solutions should be user-focused and iteratively implemented rather than one-size-fits-all approaches.
- Technology vs. Checklists: While well-designed checklists can be effective, advanced technology solutions (like RFID tags for surgical sponges) may offer superior systemic improvements over asking clinicians to be more vigilant.
Check out this article for more information about James Reason’s work and the “Swiss Cheese Model.”
Wiegmann DA, Wood LJ, Cohen TN, Shappell SA. Understanding the “Swiss Cheese Model” and Its Application to Patient Safety. J Patient Saf. 2022 Mar 1;18(2):119-123. doi: 10.1097/PTS.0000000000000810. PMID: 33852542; PMCID: PMC8514562.
Here is more information about the Elaine Bromiley Case: https://litfl.com/lessons-from-the-bromiley-case/
This episode was edited and produced by Mike Chan.
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© 2026, The Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation
This is the Anesthesia Patient Safety Podcast and I’m your host, Alli Bechtel. We’ve got a great show for you today. A couple of months ago, we hosted a podcast takeover and shared an episode of The Medical Safety Podcast with you. That was episode #325 and the hosts, Adam and Amir, shared their discussion with Dr. Rosie Benneyworth, the CEO of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which is the UK’s independent aviation-style investigatory body for medical incidents. Well, today on the show, we have the two hosts of the Medical Safety Podcast here to talk all about their unique interdisciplinary approach to patient safety, drawing on their experiences with aviation, law, and medicine.
The key themes for our discussion are:
- Looking at patient safety as a systems-level issue
- The importance of professional safety investigations
- And creating a culture where safety and efficiency are aligned rather than working against each other.
Before we dive further into the episode today, we’d like to recognize Solventum, a major corporate supporter of APSF. Solventum has generously provided unrestricted support to further our vision that “no one shall be harmed by anesthesia care”. Thank you, Solventum, – we wouldn’t be able to do all that we do without you!”
And now, my conversation with Adam and Amir, the hosts of The Medical Safety Podcast.
[Interview Show Transcript]
“Alli 1:46
Today we’re talking about patient safety from a slightly different perspective. I’m joined by Dr. Adam Shahada and Dr. Amir Hammond, the host of the Medical Safety Podcast. Their podcast explores patient safety through a really interesting combination of clinical medicine, human factors, aviation, law, incidents investigation, and systems thinking. And I think what makes their perspective particularly interesting is that they don’t just ask what went wrong, but they ask much more difficult questions like why did this make sense at the time? And what could we change so the same thing is less likely to happen again? We hope that you’ll check out their podcast. But in the meantime, Adam and Amir, welcome to the Anesthesia Patient Safety Podcast. Now, just to get us started, if you could do a brief introduction, maybe tell us a little bit about your training, career, current roles.
SPEAKER_01 2:37
It’s Adam here, and I started as a pilot actually. And I grew up uh in and around the Toronto area and went to a place called Seneca College and worked as a pilot for quite a while. I became a flight instructor, uh, which in terms of aviation actually takes a certain amount of training. And then I worked my way up eventually becoming an instructor trainer, uh, where I would take a commercial pilot and teach them how to teach people how to fly. And along the way, you supervise the whole flight school and manage a bunch of other things and so on. Along the way, I also got what’s called an airline transport pilot license, which is the license that is required to captain your large aircraft uh, you know, over an ocean, for example, but didn’t fly any of the sort of heavy airline equipment and never really went to an airline, that sort of thing. Uh along the way, I ended up uh going and becoming a lawyer, and then eventually I found my way into medicine. And currently what I do is uh I work mostly in anesthesia, though Amir and I are what are called family practice anaesthetists. So we’re family doctors who did additional training and have what’s called an enhanced competency uh skill set in anesthesia. And so Amir is the real sort of uh person who does everything in medicine where he does family medicine clinic and emergency medicine and a bunch of rural things and also anesthesia. I focus mainly on anesthesia, though in the past I have worked in emergency medicine and family medicine.
SPEAKER_02 3:48
I guess it’s my turn to go. So I uh was born and raised in the Ottawa area, so capital of Canada. I did a physiology degree first in my undergrad. I was really keen to do something in either research or healthcare related. Uh, and then along the way, I kind of got seduced by medicine, if you will. I went to med school at in McMaster in Hamilton. I then did my family medicine training and my plus one anesthesia or additional skills training uh at McMaster also. I currently practice pretty broad scope practice, as Adam said, but the majority, the vast majority of my work is in anesthesia. Again, for our international listeners, this is typically lower risk or more rural anesthesia, but because of the way the geography in Canada is laid out, you can actually get away by living quite close to an urban center and only commuting, you know, a little bit to get to those more rural places. I do about 20-ish percent of my work in emergency medicine, about five to ten percent of my work in family practice or clinic-based family practice, and the rest of it is anesthesia.
What Sparked Their Safety Focus
Alli 4:45
That’s such an interesting background for both of you coming to anesthesia and definitely very different than people that we have had on the podcast before. So this is very exciting. Now, one thing we like to do to start off the show is if you could tell us maybe what first got you interested in patient safety in your practice.
SPEAKER_02 5:04
It was something that kind of happened very spontaneously. I remember kind of initially with my first four days into anesthesia, looking into a drawer and seeing a bunch of meds that are kind of similar looking as a medical student. I’m like, oh, these all look the same. And I remember picking out a couple of vas that look the same. Like, why is this the way it is? It seems like it’s ripe for air. And then my preceptor at the time’s like, man, that’s just that’s just the way it is. That’s anesthesia. That’s what we do. That’s why they pay us the big bucks so we can read the labels more carefully. And I thought that was a bit odd. And as I progressed through my medical training, I kept running into responses when things were not going well, whether it be, you know, patient flow, disposition, acute care, whatever, whatever factor. And people said, Well, that’s just the way it is, that’s the way the system is built. And to me, that seemed kind of odd because like we can just build a better system. And so when we got to patient safety, I was very lucky that one of my mentors was very into CRM, crisis research management, and looked at safety from that perspective, individual practitioners improving their skills. And then when Adam and I met on a simulation course, we kind of got to talking and he kind of said, Hey, Amir, just so you know, this isn’t novel ground talking about system safety, talking about these aspects of clinical care. This is not unique to Madison. We’ve done it before. I’m like, what do you mean we’ve done it before? He’s like in aviation, we’ve done it before. They have it in a bunch of other industries. And so that kind of got me thinking like, hmm, maybe this isn’t actual novel ground. Maybe there is something that can be done here. So that was my foray. Adam very kindly took my hand and kind of led me through the fact that this existed and was a much broader topic than just do better as an individual physician.
SPEAKER_01 6:29
Uh, that leads nicely into sort of my answer, which is which is uh spot on with sort of a mirror. I came from an aviation background. So I went to school in Canada and Australia. And no one’s gonna be surprised at this, but in Canada, we have colleges which are um kind of like community colleges in the United States, and they do a lot of sort of trade work. Uh, and that at the time, this was going back to the year 2000, 2001, there were no university programs that provided aviation training in Canada. It was all college, if you at all went to post-secondary education, because you could just go and pay for your licenses and then you go onto the airlines eventually and so on. Now, most of the work is done in terms of post-secondary work, is done at the university level, or it’s a combined degree. And the difference between college and university is that university often has a lot of knowledge-based work as opposed to colleges with a lot of skill-based work. And the reason I give you this lead up is because when I actually went to university in Australia, again in aviation, we got a lot of training in system safety. And that’s when I got introduced to Professor James Reeson’s work. People, your listeners will be familiar with him as the inventor of what we call the Swiss cheese model of uh organizational accidents. And it was a lot of knowledge-based work. And even at that time, and his sort of his seminal work is in the sort of late 90s, he actually put together, it wasn’t just aviation, it was actually surgery, it was actually nuclear power, it was all of these other domains. And it there was a lot of interest in what they called at the time organizational accidents. And so when I came eventually to medicine, I really thought to myself, we do things a lot differently, not just in aviation, but in many other safety critical industries. And so, really, that’s the sort of lens that I came from. And one time I basically just called up Amir and we were trading sort of stories about how we could improve our own practice. And I said, I wonder if anyone would be interested in how we see things and how things might be different, and maybe we’ll interview some other people and so on. Your listeners will also probably be familiar with the Elaine Bromley story, who was a young woman who died of a can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate scenario in the UK in 2005. And at the time, her husband, Martin Bromley, who was an airline pilot, had said, I will wait for the report. And no one really knew what he was talking about. And then they said, Well, in aviation, when there’s a major accident, you know, they do an investigation, they figure out what happened, they anonymize it, and then they publish the report so that everyone can learn. And they said, Well, this is medicine, we don’t do things like that. And in fact, he actually worked really hard and had a report that was commissioned and then published. And he was then instrumental over the next 20 years. And now they have a similar system in England specifically and in Norway, where they actually have aviation-style medical investigatory boards. But that’s basically, we said, let’s see if anybody else is interested. And we started out the podcast about six months ago.
Alli 9:05
Oh, that’s awesome. And that actually answered the second part of the question, which I was gonna say, oh, let’s hear the origin story for the medical safety podcast. But that’s really cool bringing your unique backgrounds and perspectives to the
Aviation Law And Rural Medicine Lessons
Alli 9:18
show. Now, thinking about safety, since you both have very broad clinical experiences, Adam, you in particular have a background that brings together anesthesia, law, and aviation. So, how have those different perspectives changed the way that you think about patient safety?
SPEAKER_01 9:35
Much of my system safety thinking comes from aviation because it was the first industry that I was significantly involved in. And I took an interest in system safety from the very beginning of my aviation training. I read as widely as I could, purely out of self-interest. I wanted to come home to my family at night, basically. And I was really interested in how I could be the best pilot that I could be, of course, for the passengers and people on the ground and so on, but also for myself. And then when I made my way into law, I have to say that it trained me in a number of different ways. A lot of legal training is training the mind and arguments and how to deal with objections and so on. But one thing that I really take away from that profession is the service orientation. You really are doing everything you legally can in service of your client. And it really is a service-oriented profession that way. In terms of medicine, medicine really trained me, particularly anesthesia and emergency medicine, particularly trained me to work in much more resource-constrained environments than I really ever thought that I could work in. And it is a strength of the medical training system that we have right now. To me, um, I went into medicine because it had all the aspects that I liked from all the previous careers. So it had the technical and teamwork aspect of aviation, while also have a service orientation from the law. And at the end of each day, I actually get to see the effect that my work has on real people. And I find particularly the anesthesia work uh incredibly demanding and rewarding, and I’m so thankful that I get to do it.
Alli 10:51
It’s kind of cool because we always liken aviation to anesthesia. And when you’re kind of sitting at the helm of the anesthesia space, does it feel similar to being an actual pilot of a plane, or is it not as similar as we think it is?
SPEAKER_01 11:06
It is similar in some ways. Uh, and absolutely. I mean, in the sense that you have a single patient at a time with very defined phases, sort of pre-flight. How do you optimize things before the patient even shows up? Did you get a pre-operative consultation? You have your assessment when you see the patient, you have the discussion of the actual plan, the consent, and everything like that. You have the actual pre-flighting of the room itself, if you will. And I always arrive early. I’m sure most of your listeners probably do the same thing where they come in early and they set things up just the way that they like. I think we’re pretty particular in anesthesia about how we like our rooms and everything like that. Often you’ll have a huddle with the surgeon and the nurses and be saying, okay, here’s the patients that we have today. And we’ve talked with airline pilots on our podcast about how they talk about threatener management, which is one of the latest evolution of their crisis resource management, what they call crew resource management. And how that’s essentially a lot of what we do here. So some of the things that we talk about directly map one-to-one on there in terms of, you know, marshalling your resources and clear communication and things like that. And you do have a single patient at a time with very defined phases, as opposed to sometimes when I work in the emergency department, it’s completely different where you have a number of different patients, uh, and then somebody very sick comes in and you have to rearrange your plan and so on. I think if the question, if I reframe your question slightly and say how closely is it, I think it’s very close with anesthesia. And I think there are a few other ways that we can also get sort of very close if we talk about acute resuscitations, whether it’s in a resuscitation bay or on the ward or any of those places, because you have a team of highly trained professionals trying to work a problem in a fairly standardized way with incredibly high stakes. And really that becomes far more about resource management and about communication and mostly about team performance than it is about any one particular thing.
Alli 12:46
That’s a really interesting perspective. Now, Amir, you also have a very wide-ranging background with anesthesia, emergency medicine, and then the rural medicine and family medicine aspect of it. How has working in those different clinical environments changed the way you think about patient safety?
SPEAKER_02 13:05
I think looking at different settings, it makes me really aware that safety is a cultural thing. It’s not an individual practitioner thing. When you’re working in multiple different settings, each setting has its own unique challenges. Obviously, the challenges you face in the family medicine clinic or in a rural setting are very different than those that you face in an urban setting or maybe even in an OR. But the concept of system safety and dis designing things so that it’s easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing is universal. And that is ultimately a cultural and leadership issue. Not to say that the individual people in the system can’t make change or aren’t responsible for making change, but if you’re very safety-minded, but you go to bring up issues to maybe senior leadership or your colleagues and they don’t see the global picture, it becomes really hard to do those things. It’s a point that I really want to emphasize during these discussions. There’s a difference between doing the safe thing for the person in front of you and having a safe systems approach, though it overlap for sure, but the design of a system to optimize safety isn’t very reliant on an individual doing the right thing at the right time. It’s actually supposed to build redundancy so that even if you’re suboptimally performing, let’s say, use those words, that it isn’t hard to do the right thing that you’re streamlined into doing the correct thing. And I think working in all these different settings really underscores the fact that A, you can see the differences between these things, and B, you can also see that where the safety culture is very high, you either have easier change or you have things that are implemented that other places have maybe pushed back on and said it’s not a priority. We don’t have funding, et cetera, et cetera.
Alli 14:32
Oh, that is another really good answer. And we are just gonna keep expanding on some of those things that you brought up
Defining Medical Safety For Everyone
Alli 14:39
there. And I think the next question is a really big question, but I think it’s really important and we’ll just lay as a foundation too. But how would you define patient safety?
SPEAKER_01 14:49
I realize that this is the anesthesia patient safety podcast, but I actually prefer the term medical safety. And so from my flying days, uh, we speak of aviation safety because it’s clear that we’re literally all on the same ship. Something that threatens the safety of the aircraft puts both crew and passengers at risk as well as the people on the ground. And so we don’t talk about passenger safety in that sense. In a similar way in medicine, we’re starting to realize that healthcare professionals that work in the system are often the second victim. And there are books, whole books on the subject of second victim. And on our podcast, we’ve come to realize that we have the ability to improve the safety of the healthcare system while also improving its efficiency. And that if we do make the system safer, we actually it has the effect of making the work easier for those of us that work in the system. And it’s also safer for the healthcare practitioners. So we just recorded an episode that by the time this episode of yours goes to air, will actually be available. And that’s about something that I that I know that APSF has talked about, the Tennessee spinal medication incident. So that’s where four patients received spinals that were prepared in the clinical pharmacy and were labelled as a spinal anaesthetic, but in fact, the syringes contained potassium phosphate. And the APSF has a fantastic 10-minute YouTube video. Everyone that’s listening to this should go and check it out. And in that video, what you’ll hear, and as the video explains, that that intrathecal potassium phosphate injection left two patients, possibly three paralyzed. One was placed on ECMO, and people’s lives were just forever changed. But what I haven’t heard from the discussion in the medical community is that very few people have talked about how all four patients received their injections from the same anesthesiologist over the course of about three hours. And later that day, that same anesthesiologist, amongst other people, had to treat these desperately, desperately sick people. And I cannot imagine what he has gone through. But obviously he’s been deeply harmed by going to work that day. And when we as a profession realize that we’re all on the same ship, just like in aviation, is when we will start to advocate for some of these safety measures that will improve the system for everyone.
Why We Blame People First
Alli 16:45
That makes perfect sense because one of the themes that kind of comes through repeatedly that we’ve actually already talked about a couple of times, and on your podcast, and we’ve talked about it on the APSF podcast, is that distinction between individual error and system failure. And I think it’s something that anesthesia professionals think a lot about and healthcare professionals in general. So when something goes wrong, why are we so naturally drawn to asking that question? Like who made the error, instead of asking, why did the system allow this error to happen?
SPEAKER_02 17:15
It’s really complicated. As you can tell by our answers, Adam is the more academic one of us. He’s actually really well versed in this, and I think he’s underselling his expertise in this field. So I’m gonna try to answer this question as someone who’s just lived through it and has a little bit of experience. I think because it’s an easy answer, at the end of the day, when things go wrong, likely someone has had suboptimal performance at somewhere along the line. I’m not saying they did it intentionally. I’m not saying there are malicious actors out there who are intentionally harming people, but I challenge you to find a day in the OR where everything has gone perfect and everyone’s been at the top of their game. Inevitably, when something goes wrong, it’s because there was a human hand somewhere involved in it. And so it’s easy to point the fingers. It’s easy when we’re living in a culture where we look for reasons as to why things go wrong, we can find someone who can very much embody that. What I think that does, or the disservice that brings, is the fact that we take away responsibility from the system. I think we’ve all been in situations where, yes, inevitably we’ve committed an error, we’ve done something suboptimally, but we can look back and have many explanations as to why they got there within the clinical context in which we work. And that’s the frame that I think we should be working towards. As your podcast has shown, as I think the expertise have shown, there’s a discourse where we’re very much shifting towards that systems level based thinking. I think we’re very uh at the beginning of that journey as a profession, as a field. I think the thinking will evolve over time because it makes more robust and safe systems. It makes it safer for all of us to participate in healthcare, either as practitioners or delivering care. But I think right now it’s an easy response to blame an individual. We don’t have the global discourse to show that systems are systems and they have an important role in patient safety. And I don’t think there’s we’re now just gaining the momentum to look at it that way because we can see the real benefits of looking at it from a systems lens rather than an individual blame-centric lens.
SPEAKER_01 19:02
I agree with Amir. And I just wanted to add on, I think that a large part of it as we do this podcast, Amir and me, I think a big part that I’m starting to realize is I think when you look at what physicians have typically been responsible for, it’s their own actions and the actions of their team and possibly their hospital. If you look at other types of safety critical industries, whether it’s aviation, nuclear power, oil and gas, et cetera, they actually have independent investigatory bodies who can look at the whole system. So if you look at a local investigation like morbidity and mortality, even if, and we know not all cases go there, even if you go to a local MM round, they don’t have the ability to say, well, we should have had more resources from the ministry or we should have had a better regulatory body or any of those things. So we are stuck with looking at things from a very particular lens. And historically it’s always been done that way. And so we, as a profession, also tend to take an outsized responsibility and think that we can control and prevent bad outcomes, possibly to a degree than we really can. And that’s not just me saying there is other research out there that says that, in particular in anesthesia, we feel like our actions have a much bigger impact than they may in fact have. I there’s lots of examples that I won’t go into, but I think one of the big things, just if we look at um something that APSF has talked about a lot in the past, APSF has led the fight amongst other people in terms of look-alike drugs, which we saw in the Tennessee spinal incident, for example. We’ve been talking about deaths, not just harm, but deaths from look-alike drugs for decades. But in Tennessee, that was one of the prime factors that were there. We had look-alike drugs that were incredibly similar, that were stored in close proximity, and that were almost indistinguishable from one another. Now, that wasn’t the only factor in there. However, that’s what a systems approach will look at about how not just how we can actually do it, it’s not just telling people we need to segregate these drugs. It’s also why wasn’t it? As Amir has said before, why wasn’t it done? What made that made sense and and how can we actually change things? So there are other people doing this work that are not clinicians, such as Dr. Ken Catchpole, who works currently in the United States and is originally from Oxford and other places like that. And he’s talked to us about symbols and icons. So, you know, we’re all familiar that when a nurse hangs a bag of medication, for example, after you step a few feet away from that IV pole, that black lettering on a clear bag is almost indistinguishable and you can’t really tell what that is. However, what Ken Catchpole’s work has done is he said, well, what if you color code it and put a symbol like a biohazard symbol and we’ll call that an icon? And you can have paralytics as one class of drugs that might look one way. And then from a distance, you can actually see what that looks like. And so that’s one way that we can actually make the system a little bit different. So I think that it’s a temptation that we have, and I think it’s in part because historically it’s what we’ve always done, but also because, quite frankly, in medicine, we don’t yet have the tools that we have in other places like transportation. Both the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand all have transportation safety boards that look at the whole system. We don’t have those in those countries, but they do have them in Norway and in England right now.
Alli 21:55
I think historically we have blamed the individual professional. Who has like pushed the wrong medication as just the easy answer, somebody find blame? And we’ve said just to the humans, like, do better. And we’re learning, though, that we could continue to do that, but we’re just not going to get anywhere. And I do think this renewed focus and the shift to systems-based thinking is making a huge difference when it comes to patient safety. But obviously, there’s still more work to do. And there are still other considerations.
Accountability Human Factors And Just Culture
Alli 22:25
So is there ever a point where systems-based explanation of risk becomes an excuse for poor performance? Is this something that we have to watch out for?
SPEAKER_01 22:34
So it’s a surprisingly common question. And it ties right into what you were just saying, Ali. It’s a surprisingly common question in medical incident investigation. And I realize now that it just means there’s a misunderstanding of how a system safety approach actually does identify and strengthen the system as a whole, which includes individual behavior. And so let’s suppose that in the aftermath of a medical incident, we have a full-scale investigation that occurred. And one of the many deficiencies that may have been found was a lack of knowledge of a frontline worker. Let’s just say that that’s in fact what happened. The question then becomes, what do we do about it? And we used to do this in aviation, by the way. You used to see investigative reports that were replete with the words pilot error or the pilot failed to do X. But we have to remember that in almost all aviation accidents, there was something that the pilot could have done to prevent or mitigate the harm that actually occurred. The same is true in most medical incidents. Most of the time, someone, a doctor or nurse, could have done something to prevent or mitigate that bad outcome. But just because there may have been something that a frontline worker could have done doesn’t mean that we stopped the inquiry there. Of course there was poor performance. That’s actually the answer, not the actual question. The question is, why did this person or why did this team perform poorly? Why did the team in Elaine Bromley’s situation fail to cut the front of the neck and provide a surgical airway? In the face of, for example, the fact that the nurses came in and brought the trait kit and said, doctors to the two experienced anesthesiologists and had an neck surgeon, here is the trait kit. And they got no response. Why did that happen? And we saw this in aviation in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, where we had planes that were crashing and the aircraft were generally well functioning. It’s not because they had some major mechanical malfunction. And what happened was they were trying to troubleshoot an issue. They got focused on that and they were circling, trying to make sense of it, et cetera, et cetera. And other pilots, for example, were telling them that, well, we don’t have the fuel for this, and the captain wasn’t listening, maybe he didn’t hear them, and so on. There wasn’t this graded assertiveness that we have now, any of these things that we have now. These things came as a result from the accident investigation, but the team overall failed to do what needed to be done, which was land the airplane, even if a part of the landing gear may or may not have been working. And everyone died, or many, many people died. That’s analogous to Elaine Bromley, where the nurse comes in and says, Well, here’s the tray kit, but doesn’t get a response. There is another situation where, again, the plane crashed because the aircraft control column got bumped, the autopilot got disconnected, they got a little bit low, like 300 feet low. And in the cockpit, the investigators could hear on the cockpit voice recorder that a chime, an alert had gone off, warning them that they were actually 300 feet below their assigned altitude, but nobody reacted to it. Just like those physicians didn’t react to the actual nurse coming in and saying, here’s the track kit. And that’s because we now know from a human factors approach that they probably didn’t physically hear them because in terms of a stress response, that’s one of the first things to go. And so if we stop it, if we if we just say, well, these are bad apples, then we’re going to have, as you’ve said, Ali, the same sort of response, which is not to actually say what aviation did, which is to say, well, ask why multiple times. Let’s try an intervention, which they invented CRM, which we now tried to import into uh medicine. And so the poor performing person or team, that’s the outcome, right? That’s actually the result. We need to know what the contributing factors were. And so if we look at other safety critical industries, we’ll see that let’s say we have someone who has a knowledge gap and that resulted in something here. The broader systems question is how did that person come to have that role with still having that knowledge problem? And perhaps we need to train all nurses, doctors, respiratory therapists, whoever, about this specific issue so that it doesn’t happen to other people. And we start from a systems perspective before we ever get to culpability of any individual. Uh, I’m gonna leave it there because I know Amir has thoughts on this as well, and I can always come back.
SPEAKER_02 26:16
The thing that helped me understand this concept, because like I said, I’m not coming to this in the same place as Adam is like I think us as anaesthetists can understand that if we’ve worked a whole 24-hour shift on call and we’re doing a very complicated case at like the start of 20, the 23rd hour after not sleeping all night, after doing a complex resuscitation, and you know, we for whatever reason like pick up Zofran instead of Kitara Cortal, and then we misadminister them. I think when you say, Oh, is that a medical error? We can all sit back and think, well, well, inevitably you should have given drug A instead of drug B, but we can all understand that a system that’s making you work after 24 hours of on call and consistent work is perhaps not a system that’s optimized for safety. So that’s not to say that the individual had no role in this, but I think when I look at it to say, hey, was this person put in a disadvantageous position or a position that’s setting them up to fail and or you know, maybe contributing to the problem? And is it better to be addressed that? As Adam said, imagine if we had the counterfactual where this person was super well rested and the drugs were optimally labelled and design, do we think that medication error could have happened? Maybe, maybe not. Maybe someone just really did not understand what these drugs are doing. But you know, pointing that as a reason when we have all these other reasons as to why that could have happened is the real inherent uh a question about blame. So again, I just want to stress like when you look at it from the assistance perspective, if the situation was ideal, right? If there was another practitioner, would they have made the same mistake or could we imagine them making the same mistake? If the answer is typically yes, because it’s not really in individual’s control, or you know, there’s other factors playing into it, I think that’s when we can start talking about blame maybe being offloaded onto the individual. Again, I think Adam and I both clearly said, like, there’s room for, I use the term blame loosely, but individual performance may have a role in certain negative outcomes or errors. But to really attribute blame to the individual, I think you really need to say, is the system functioning optimally and where they set up for failure, where they set up for success.
SPEAKER_01 28:06
Just to jump onto what Amir said there, I think I want to make three quick points. The first is the idea that sometimes we do hold people accountable because poor performance is the result. But I think the question is sometimes we need to hold people accountable, but that’s not the first impulse. The impulse that we often have comes back to what we call the fundamental attribution error, which is this idea that if we attribute to people’s character something that has gone wrong, but when we are ourselves do it, we see that in fact there’s a lot of environmental factors that went through it. So if I’m if I watch someone spill a cup of coffee, I say, well, that person’s clumsy. But if I grab the cup of coffee myself, I realize that the cup was paper thin and the coffee was really hot and I burned my hand. Uh and so we call that the fundamental attribution error. And that’s why we tend to blame people for things. Okay, fine. What is the response? So if we talk about culpability, if it’s a deliberate act, we should hold people accountable. It rarely is. We shouldn’t jump to the idea that these are bad apples because we know that it’s just not a response that’s gonna help anyone. And then also we should look at it and say it’s easy to say someone didn’t read the label. Um, it’s much harder to change the system when we have look-alike drugs. But if we go back to the Tennessee vinyl medication incident, we see that there were four people in that clinical pharmacy. There was technician one, technician two in the mixing room, technician three who was supervising, and a pharmacist. Are you trying to tell me, or is someone who might have this response, trying to tell me that those are all four bad apples that just happen to align? I think that’s incredibly unlikely. And so I think the real question is how does a system actually respond? And I mentioned before about a lack of training and so on. And then things that we haven’t talked about are the organization’s responsibility. In my view, if we look at what Professor James Reeson has put out, he has culpability models. And he has two of them. One is an organizational culpability model, and one is an individual culpability model. And you don’t look at the individual culpability model until you’ve asked yourself the questions in the organizational one, because it’s incumbent on the organization to actually ensure that there is proper training, safe working conditions, workable equipment, et cetera, et cetera. Only after all those things have been actually satisfied, then we might look at the individual uh culpability model and say, was the harm deliberate? Was there a history of unsafe acts? Would it pass the substitution test in the sense of have other people in similar situations done these things in the past, et cetera? And so I think, first of all, system safety can absolutely hold people accountable, but it’s a very narrow set of circumstances. And our first impulse should be let’s look at the system and ask, how can we strengthen the system? So let’s say there was someone who actually had an incredibly weak knowledge set. For whatever reason, we should really ask ourselves how many other people are similarly situated and how can we prevent that from happening in the future.
What Strong Safety Fixes Look Like
Alli 30:37
And that leads to, I think, the next logical step, which is to say, so once we have this averse event, we often see some of the recommendations like that you mentioned. So education for the staff, reminding people about the policy or the protocol, providing additional training, maybe introducing another checklist. We do love checklists, those are great. So sometimes that can be helpful. And then telling people to be more vigilant, probably less helpful. So why are these interventions so attractive on the surface? But why are they often inadequate? And what do you think makes a really strong safety intervention?
SPEAKER_01 31:17
I think first and foremost, we have to start having professional safety investigation, as they have in Norway, as they have in England, and as they have in most countries’ national transportation systems. That professional investigation will be independent and will be well resourced and will look at the whole system. And they determine the causes and contributing factors of an incident, considering all of the factors. And so once we review the whole system from training, human factors, equipment, staffing, et cetera, they will identify the causes and contributing factors of that. If we start from a local MM perspective, all we can look at is the behaviors of the people that were involved and the local resources at the hospital level. And of course, the perennial intervention suggested afterwards is well, now that people know about this incident, they should be more careful and they should be more vigilant, and here’s some more training and so on. That is not what we call system safety. That’s individual accountability. And that is that’s it’s gotten us to where we are, and we can do a lot better. Once the risk is identified, we have to do a risk assessment to determine how likely is this to actually occur again, how severe would the outcome be? And then we have to actually see what interventions can possibly be put in place. We talked before about we’ve known for a long time that look-alike drug vials are a problem, and yet we’ve seen very little action on this. We can go back to any year in any country and see that people have died or been seriously harmed from medication errors that could have been prevented from changing how we manufacture drugs and how we display them and so on. And so we do a cost-benefit analysis. I think people have this idea that, well, cost, we can’t be as safe as the aviation industry. We hear this all the time because we can’t just raise ticket prices. First of all, that’s not how aviation works. Um, we when you and I buy airline tickets, uh, I don’t go for the most expensive. I, you know, I tend to go for the least expensive. And cost, as we’ve heard from airline pilots on our program, is probably the most competitive aspect. The other thing is just from a purely factual point of view, we have the advent of low-cost carriers 25 years ago, and we’ve seen that cost per kilometre per flying kilometer has dramatically fallen. It was $2.50 or so per flying kilometre. It’s now about 50 cents per kilometre. Meanwhile, uh the safety standards have gone up and we’ve actually improved safety considerably. So I think there’s this idea that it’s safety is always going to come at an increased cost. That’s not the case. However, you can imagine that there are some situations in which cost might be cost prohibitive. So cost is a factor, but we consider it only after we’ve identified what the potential intervention might be. I see a lot of people that say, well, we cannot do this because it would cost too much when they haven’t conducted a full analysis. They’ve just raised this knee-jerk reaction as we can’t have, you know, duty times when in fact we can have duty times. Uh, they do it in Norway, they do it in other countries and so on. So the reality is we need to look at what other places, other industries, other medical places are actually doing. And we need to do it in a considered way. So you have a professional safety investigation, you identify the risk, you propose some interventions, you have a cost-benefit analysis, and then you have an iterative process. We’re not, we’re not gonna just solve something once and we never have this problem again. That’s not what happens in aviation, it’s not what happens anywhere else. You try and put something in place, whether it’s duty times or whether it’s NR fit epidural adapters, so we can’t put IV medications into by accident through an epidural catheter or whatever happens to be. And the next time, because there’s always a next time, then that professional safety review looks at again as to what has happened and said, well, this intervention failed and do we need to revise it? And what else do we need to do? But that is how a mature safety system, a safety systems approach, would look at what we are going to actually do in the face of a serious medical incident? What intervention should we put in? Is it cost effective? And then how do we actually move forward?
SPEAKER_02 34:51
When you ask, how do we determine when an intervention is actually likely to reduce risk, broadly speaking, right? Because I think that’s really the spirit of this question. How do we know if a checklist additional training? First of all, I think we as all to some degree of scientists, we understand the scientific method. There’s a hypothesis, this is the deficit, this is the intervention, does it work or does it not work? Right. I think the challenge we run into is when we take information that isn’t directly applicable to this safety issue and then apply that intervention. We all know as anaesthetists, as people who deal with resuscitations, checklists are not the be all and end all. They do not solve all our problems. We can’t just put a checklist on everything we do and then assume it’s going to be safer and better. We know that. And so one of the reasons we know that is we intuitively understand that the nature of the problems are different. That’s what Adam was saying. When you do a full-some investigation as to why this actually happened, what are the different parts of the system that have failed to lead to this? That’s when you can start uh implementing specific interventions there. I look at safety as a process. It isn’t just we have an issue, we apply a problem, and that’s it. Like if it’s not fixed, that the thing is done, right? It’s all an iterative process where we implement an intervention and see if that actually addresses the problem. If not, we try again or we modify things. Like we’ll talk, I’m sure, about checklists later, but if you just go back to Atul Gwande’s checklist manifesto, he has multiple chapters where they had tried to modify the checklist to be effective. I think it’s not uh as much as I like or dislike the book, we can get into that later. I think what stands out to me is it wasn’t that they just invented a checklist, gave it, and worked on the first shot. It required going to the people using it, seeing how they can modify, so on and so forth. This is the same thing with all safety interventions. We don’t just come up with a new piece of equipment, put it on the OR table and say, now that’s going to stop you from doing XYZ, right? It’s all about the implementation, it’s user-focused design or having that, you know, design-based uh creation and implementation that’s really pivotal in addressing these issues. And at the end of the day, obviously a cost-benefit analysis is super, super key. If there’s a piece of equipment that costs $10 million to manufacture, but it’ll solve the problem. And the problem’s only occurring once a year and it costs us $30 to actually deal with. That’s not effective. And I think we kind of get up in administrative levels thinking, well, we’re gonna get this piece of equipment or these pieces of equipment and it’s gonna cost us $10 million more. Can you promise we’re gonna save X amount of lives without doing the analysis? It’s very hard to do. But I’m sure we’ll get to a couple of examples about when things are intuitive and they need to be fixed and we run into budgetary constraints versus when they are unintuitive and we implement them and we get pushback for that.
Flashy Tech And Checklist Traps
Alli 37:08
Well, speaking of which, can you give an example of a patient safety intervention that looks really impressive or big on paper, but probably isn’t doing much?
SPEAKER_01 37:17
My answer for this is almost anything with highly advanced technology. There’s in my mind so much low-hanging fruit in medicine as compared to other industries, but we don’t want to attend actual training on how to read a piece of paper and use a checklist. We want to learn how to use robots that perform surgery or help perform surgery or use AI because it’s cutting edge and it’s sexy and so on. It’s seen as insulting to be told that we can’t read a list as highly trained professionals and actually work together as a team. Um but I think the problem is that uh these uh very low-tech solutions are deceptively simple. Um it’s not, it’s not like pilots get in there day one and are just reading a list and know how to use a checklist. In fact, they train on it and again and again and again in in normal, abnormal emergency situations, in situations where you have to cut things short in team environments, and then also when they have to do with other team members, and then they have to do it and they have to throw all the rules out the window and go with what they really have to do. So, you know, it’s not as simple as giving people a piece of paper. But uh, in my mind, anything with highly advanced technology at this stage, it has a lot of promise, but uh I think that it’s um it looks impressive, but at this stage, I think it’s a bit early for some of these interventions.
SPEAKER_02 38:24
I will just jump in quickly. My overrated safety intervention, uh, if that’s kind of the way we’re framing it or the way I’m looking at it, is checklists, and not because checklists are ineffective. I actually think checklists, when done well and applied appropriately, are some of the most effective safety interventions. What I find to be a problem is that sometimes people just throw checklists on things and say, now we have a checklist and this will protect us from all the bad things, right? Like I’ve seen checklists for really complicated procedures that line everything step by step, not understanding that the procedure is acute. And when you have to do something immediately in the moment, you don’t have time or the mental capacity to do it. That’s why when I go to simulations, whether I help run them or whether I participate in the thing that sticks out to me that the facilitator stresses that, you know, if you’ve never used a checklist before, maybe in the middle of an acutely crashing patient is not the right time to pull out this checklist and look at it for the first time. I also find that people in administrative positions or people who don’t quite understand how the work is done will throw on checklists as a way of bandaging and solving the problem. We have, you know, whatever complication on the floor, we’ll make sure we put a checklist on there, not understanding is it accessible, is it legible, does it use technically correct language? And then when it doesn’t work, they kind of sit there and be like, man, people just aren’t using the checklist effectively without any sort of feedback or development on like how the checklist is used and implemented, which is why I think checklists are overrated to some extent, because you see them everywhere, even when it’s not really appropriate. But when they’re designed and developed and implemented correctly, they’re some of the best safety interventions.
SPEAKER_01 39:46
So I 100% co-sign that. I’m I yeah, yeah, I think that’s great.
Alli 39:50
And I think it speaks to how important communication and teamwork is when it comes to patient safety, because that’s really how you can put the checklists into play and having that flexibility too, like knowing when you need to move quickly and maybe not follow every line of the checklist and when you need to follow every line of the checklist and how that team functions together in those different situations. Yeah, no, it’s great hearing both sides.
SPEAKER_01 40:15
I think one of the big things about checklists is that not everything is a checklist, right? Well, sometimes we’re doing things in medicine that are not, in fact, checklists, but we want to call them a checklist. That’s just not how checklists are actually meant to be used, right? Oftentimes we’re talking about SOPs or protocol or any number of other sorts of interventions that are almost or similar to that. Um, and as the often phrase is, you know, when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, it’s kind of, well, let’s just put another checklist in there.
Redesigning Systems That Keep Failing
Alli 40:39
Now, I know that we’ve covered this topic in in depth already, but I just really am interested to hear your answer. So I’m gonna go ahead and ask it, even though there’s gonna be a little bit of repetition. But if the same error keeps happening, at what point should we stop asking clinicians to just be better and start asking whether the system is badly designed? I think we already know your answers, but I’m really interested to hear it.
SPEAKER_01 41:02
I actually I have strong feelings about this. So I’m gonna take this one and Amir, uh feel free to jump in afterwards, no worries. So as we’ve said before, we see the intervention that comes out or the proposed corrective action after a medical incident has been investigated. We see that it’s well, doctor or nurse do it better. You now know about this incident. Uh, you need to be more vigilant. And vigilance only carries you so far. Uh, and I think that’s one of the big problems that we have in our industry. If we go back, we should, in my view, say that it’s time for frontline practitioners and people who set policy and provide the resources to stop being given the choice of which incidents they’re going to investigate and what aspects of the system are going to be considered for review and what recommendations will be produced. We don’t do this in aviation, we don’t do this in nuclear power, we don’t do this in oil and gas. Um, professional safety investigation is rightly independent of the regulator so that all aspects of the system can be considered. We do that under the transportation sector, and now we do that in the UK and Norway. They have similar investigatory bodies uh to their transportation boards, and they do them for medical incidents. We, Amir and I, on our podcast, looked at a really great report from what’s called the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, that’s the one in England, about retained surgical sponges. And what was really interesting, this was a woman named Helen, and they also looked at 31 other reports, but they have a reference case. Her name was Helen. She had a coronary artery bypass graft or cabbage open heart surgery, as your listeners will know. And she unfortunately had a retained surgical sponge that was found the day after her surgery or later that that day, quite late into the evening, when she started to have some respiratory problems. They shot an X-ray, they didn’t initially identify it, they finally realized there was a retained sponge in her chest cavity. She got taken to the operating room the next day. They opened her up, they removed the sponge, and they she became too unstable. They closed her in the operating room, they did not shoot the x-ray there. They took her to the recovery room, they shot an x-ray there, and then they had to go back the next day because they actually had a second retained surgical sponge. So she had her chest cracked for a third time and they removed the sponge. And then, of course, this prompted the investigation. And they looked at also 31 other local MM or local investigations about retained surgical sponges. And here’s the interesting thing: one of the responses from the frontline workers, the nurses and doctors who are responsible for the count in the actual OR, not that specific count, but overall, when they finally figured out what the investigation was about, it was well, how are we going to spend more time doing the count or reconciliation or what have you, when 99.99% of the time the count is actually keeps everyone safe and it’s fine. If we spend more time on this process, then what’s going to happen to the person who doesn’t have access to an operating rock because we’re being less efficient and that’s a problem. And the HSIB, I think, had a great response, which was, well, that’s not the only thing that we can do. If you look at it from a local investigatory point of view, yeah, that’s all you have control over, is your behavior and you’re using the equipment that is procured by somebody else. But the HSIP has the ability to look at, well, maybe we should procure different sponges. And in the United States, for example, they have some studies that suggest that they have RFID tag sponges where they can wave a scanner over a patient and know that there aren’t any at least sponges. It doesn’t work for everything, obviously. And their actual studies, we don’t know if they’re put out by the manufacturer of the sponges, were that it actually makes things safer, it makes things more efficient, and uh your better use of OR time and it’s easier for the people in the system. So it appears to be a win-win-win that way. And it’s this idea that when we look at system safety, sometimes we can have it all. We can make things safer and more efficient and easier to use. The recommendation from the HCIB was not well, we should all use RFID tag sponges. It was we should consider how procurement affects things. We should consider this as one way. And then they also said, well, we should perhaps consider how we can do the count slightly differently, because lots of clinicians will do things in many different ways. We’ve been doing the count about the same for about 100 years. Maybe we should consider an actual human factors redesign and maybe we should actually analyze and how are the best ways that we can actually keep people safe. And so to answer the overall question about when should we redesign the system versus telling people to be more vigilant, I think the answer is most of the time we should at least consider the systemic factors that are at play. Because if we have a system that just requires people to be perfect, uh, which is more or less what we have right now, we ask doctors and nurses to be almost faultless. We don’t have a fault tolerant system, we’re gonna keep having the same errors, the same bad outcomes. And that’s really it.
SPEAKER_02 45:12
I I’m glad Adam went first because it gave me a lot of time to think about this question and this answer. And if the idea is like if the same error keeps happening, when should we move the blame or when should we think it’s a systemic issue? I I think what I really want to say is that when an error occurs, the first instinct should be is this a system’s error? Oftentimes we don’t get a lot of hallmark or you know, yellow flags if you will in medicine. And I think we should be looking at errors or things that go wrong, or whatever you want to call them, always through a systems level lens. For example, if someone is asked to administer nitroglycerin during a cesarean section delivery, right, why are there three different formulations of nitroglycerin in the drawer? Why is it sometimes required as a double dilution, or why do we have all these things, right? Like if that error occurs once, that should be enough of a flag to say, well, why did this error occur in the first place? Is it because the physician was not knowledgeable about nitroglycerin dosing? Is it because it comes in many different formulations? I think the question supposes that any error that occurs singularly is not a systems error, but all errors have the potential and have a very high likelihood of being systems errors. The fact that we get multiple errors in the same fashion almost by default shows it to be a systems issue or the system being poorly designed. I would say every error should be looked at as a potential systems error in disguise that we misattribute as an individual performance issue.
SPEAKER_01 46:29
I think part of it is that we don’t get training in medical school, or at least not very much, about what is an error, what are system safety, and how do we actually approach these things. So an error is a consequence, it’s it’s a part of human nature. If you look at James Reeson’s work, he has a great line, and I think he also, I think this is also from the 1999 to Ur is human in the United States, but the idea that error is a product of being human. We’re always going to have errors. The error does not actually necessarily make its way to a bad outcome. What we’re trying to prevent as a system is the bad outcome. So we have to have things that are fault tolerant and so on. So the question isn’t why did the clinician make the error? The question is how do we prevent, trap, and mitigate errors? And when we actually properly frame the question of how do we prevent errors, I’ll give you a very simple example. We switched to a new electronic medical record system in my hospital. And every once in a while, I’m pretty diligent with my, you know, as a as a as a reformed lawyer, uh, pretty diligent with my documentation. And so I kept getting, well, Dr. Shahada, here are the four patients this year that you forgot to, or this month that you forgot to put your um ASA codes in for, and we need uh an ASA code for this. And after about the fourth month of this, and this email, of course, would go to several different people in the hospital. I’m going, this is such a waste of everyone’s time. I finally asked the question, why do I have to put in exactly how much flu IV fluid this patient got? It won’t let me finalize the record, but it will let me finalize the record when I don’t have an ASA code, which we know is one of the mandatory fields that’s required. I never got a reply to that, but all of a sudden that error stopped happening because now I can’t finalize the record until the ASA code is all of a sudden in there. And so I think that’s really an example of well, if we just change the system, we won’t have the error so much, right? It’s not as easy as that for most of the things that we’re talking about, but it is interesting that it’s a small, but I think powerful example of how we can actually change the system and make it easier to work in.”
We still have more from my conversation with Adam and Amir, but you are going to have to tune in next week for the exciting conclusion as we dive further into the ideas of safety and efficiency. Can safety and efficiency co-exisit or are they always competing goals? What is the predominant culture at your institution? Plus, we are going to have some rapid fire questions at the end of our talk that you don’t want to miss.
If you have any questions or comments from today’s show, please email us at podcast@apsf.org. Please keep in mind that the information in this show is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute medical or legal advice. We hope that you will visit APSF.org for detailed information and check out the show notes for links to all the topics we discussed today.
Thank you for listening to the Anesthesia Patient Safety Podcast. We hope you found today’s conversation informative and that it gave you some practical ideas you can bring back to your own practice. How does your hospital respond when there is a medication error? And do you need to move to more systems level thinking rather than just a call for more education and training at the individual level.
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